Abstract. We study the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) in integer-splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents can strategically assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but must distribute this demand in fixed-size parts. Such scenarios arise in a wide range of application domains, including job scheduling and network routing, where agents have to allocate multiple tasks and can assign a number of tasks to a particular selected resource. Specifically, in an ISWCG, an agent has a certain total demand (aka weight) that it needs to satisfy, and can do so by requesting one or more integer units of each resource from an element of a given collection of feasible subsets.
Introduction
The study of interaction of multiple self-interested parties ("agents") sharing commonly-available facilities ("resources") is central to computational game theory. Such settings naturally arise in a wide range of typical application domains, from traffic routing in networks (e.g. roads, air traffic or information and communication networks (Rosenthal, 1973a; Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002) ), to competition in job scheduling problems (e.g. for computational services or machine scheduling (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999) ).
In many real-world scenarios in these domains, agents may find it beneficial to assign different amounts of demand to different resources, but may have restrictions on the size of units in which this demand is distributed. For example, consider a job scheduling problem, comprised of n agents and m independent machines, where each agent has several indivisable jobs to be executed. To each selected machine, an agent pays a usage cost, which is equal to the number of jobs the agent allocates to that machine multiplied by the unit-cost per job, typically depending on the total level of demand on the machine (i.e., its congestion). A similar situation arises in communication networks (e.g. the Internet), where agents send packets (or, messages) and have to decide how many packets to route on each path in the network to minimise possible delays. Additional examples for a problem of this kind may include procuring factor inputs for manufacturing processes or purchasing transport capacity for logistics networks. Importantly, in all these situations, the agents cannot split their demands in arbitrary ways, but must do so in integer units.
Problems of this kind are addressed in the literature as integer-splittable weighted congestion games (ISWCGs), where agents strategically choose from a common set of resources, and are allowed to assign multi-unit requests to each of their selected resources; however, they are constrained to make their allocations in fixed-size parts (particularly, integer units). Each resource is equipped with a "unit-cost function" that indicates the cost that each agent pays per unit of request, depending on the aggregate level of congestion on that resource (i.e., the total number of units the users contribute to the resource). Since the agents may have different congestion impacts, the cost each agent has to pay for the use of a particular resource is the product of the amount of units it requests from that resource and the corresponding unit-cost. For example, in a computational services setting, if an agent were to purchase four units of processor time from a particular service provider, it would pay the same unit-cost for all four units, with the unit-cost determined by the total demand from all agents for that resource. The overall agent's cost is given by the sum of its costs for each resource it uses. In a ISWCG, each agent has a certain integer demand (or, weight) for resource units it needs to satisfy, and its aim is to minimise the total cost of the units by distributing its weight across the available resources. Unit-cost functions are resource-specific, but are the same for all agents (i.e., resource providers cannot discriminate between users), while demands for resource units can vary across the agents. Note that the above examples are captured in the ISWCG model by identifying the set of resources with the set of machines or network links, respectively, where differences in their technical parameters and performance factors, such as efficiency, or speed, are reflected by resource-dependent costs per unit (e.g. job, or data packet). An agent's demand
